Griffiths’s decisive intervention is to dismantle legal centralism: the assumption that law is a single, unified and hierarchically organised system emanating from the state. Legal pluralism instead describes social fields in which multiple normative orders coexist, overlap and compete for practical authority. The theoretical contribution is therefore not simply a multiplication of legal sources but a redefinition of law as socially distributed regulation. Methodologically, Griffiths distinguishes weak forms of pluralism, in which non-state orders remain subordinated to state recognition, from a stronger descriptive conception capable of analysing normativity without presuming a sovereign centre. This shift makes authority observable in practices, institutions and semi-autonomous social formations rather than only in formal doctrine. The wider bridge reaches anthropology, political sociology and urban governance: land, access, property, custom and everyday regulation become intelligible as products of interacting normative regimes whose boundaries are negotiated rather than given.